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Importing Development

IMPORTING DEVELOPMENT: THE CHINESE
NATIONALISTS’ EMBRACE OF JEWISH
SETTLEMENT PLANS DURING WORLD WAR II
Harril Saunders (Princeton University)
On Christmas Eve, 1938, Shanghai Municipal Council
(SMC) Secretary G. Godfrey Phillips sent an urgent cable to the
American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (AJJDC):
MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT SHANGHAI IS GRAVELY PERTURBED BY
ABNORMAL INFLUX OF JEWISH REFUGEES SHANGHAI IS ALREADY FACING MOST SERIOUS REFUGEE
PROBLEM DUE TO SINOJAPANESE HOSTILITIES IT
IS QUITE IMPOSSIBLE TO ABSORB ANY LARGE NUMBER OF FOREIGN REFUGEES.1
ing into Shanghai. A year after Japanese generals ordered the
German Jews’ worst fears of the Nazi regime, hundreds of
refugees poured into Shanghai every week.2 But as Phillips’
cable shows, Shanghai’s run as the world’s most welcoming port
for Jewish refugees was coming to an end.
Shanghai enjoyed an unusual political status in the
early days of World War II. Japan occupied most of the city
from August 1937, but left control of the International Settlement, the longtime cosmopolitan legal haven of European and
American businessmen, in the hands of the Shanghai Municipal
Council (SMC), the Settlement’s multinational government established in the wake of China’s defeat in the First Opium War
(1839-1842). Under the SMC’s purview, Shanghai remained one
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of the few ports in the world that would allow stateless persons
entry. From August 1937 to August 1939, when the SMC began
tightly restricting entry, over 20,000 Jewish refugees, mostly
3

Soon after Phillips sent his cable, Sun Ke, leader of the
Nationalist (Guomindang or Kuomintang) government’s legislative branch and Republic of China founder Sun Yat-sen’s only
refugees to Shanghai. He began drafting a plan to settle Jewish
refugees in southwest China on a massive scale. On February
17th, 1939, Sun made his proposal to the National Defense Supreme Council in Chongqing, the southwestern city where the
Nationalists had made their headquarters since December 1937.
He emphasized the humanitarian contribution the government
war effort. If the Nationalists could win favor among prominent Jews, who they assumed held considerable sway in British
and American politics, then those countries would be more
likely to support them in the war against the Japanese.4 In June,
Jewish German industrialist Jacob Berglas announced his own
plan for a refugee settlement in Yunnan, China’s most southwestern province.5 New York dentist Maurice William, who
had written back in 1934 that “China is the one great hope for
Hitler’s victims,” soon approached the Nationalist government
with his own plan for a settlement.6 Both Berglas and William’s
within the Nationalist government. Though the proposal ultimately failed because of a lack of funding, there is no doubting
the sincerity of all three parties’ efforts to make the settlement
a reality.
Despite a rich literature of historical studies on both
plans for Jewish settlements outside of Palestine and the
Shanghai Jewish community in particular, scholars have largely
ignored the resettlement plans hatched by Sun, Berglas, and
Penn History Review
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William.7 The plans’ ultimate failures contribute to this dearth
the proposals in either Chinese or Western records after 1940.
Furthermore, China’s current regime has made it exceedingly
lowing foreign scholars to make thirty photocopies per year at
China’s Second Historical Archives in Nanjing.8 However, the
publication of numerous sourcebooks in both Chinese and
English in recent years has offered Western scholars a renewed
Yunnan Plans.

Sun Ke, son of Sun Yat-sen, circa 1928
Historian of East Asia, Gao Bei, remains the only
Western scholar who has thoroughly studied the Yunnan Plans.
Gao understands the Nationalists’ support for the Yunnan
Plans as part of their war strategy against the Japanese, as
well as an attempt to boost China’s international stature more
broadly. Gao’s analysis illuminates one of the central themes of
the Yunnan Plans’ history from the Chinese perspective, while
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Republican China sought to establish its place in the interwar
world order.9 Yet several questions remain: Why did a Jewish
settlement in southwest China so strongly capture the imaginations of William and Berglas? Why were the Nationalists, long
mass immigration of a religious group to the interior of their
country? And how did both groups envision the future of the
settlement in a post-war world?
To answer these questions, my approach will differ from
Gao’s in two important ways. First, lacking access to physical
archives located in Taiwan, Nanjing, and Jerusalem, I have not
assembled the source material necessary to trace causal links between William’s creation of the Yunnan settlement idea in 1933,
Sun’s adoption of the idea in 1939, and Sun and Berglas’ promotion of their own plans later that year. I will instead analyze
the underlying political assumptions of the plans themselves to
understand how two groups as seemingly different as Western
Jews and Nationalist Chinese could coalesce around such an
ambitious project. Second, while Gao has analyzed the Yunnan Plans in the Chinese political context, I will place them in
the Jewish political context as well, revealing how William and
body of scholarship on the Uganda Scheme, Theodor Herzl’s
plan to settle European Jews in British East Africa, as well as
subsequent Jewish settlement plans, historians have yet to place
the Yunnan Plans in the context of this tradition.10
My analysis of the Yunnan Plans’ broader intellectual
context will reveal that both Jewish and Chinese leaders’ notions of economic and political development were critical to
their support of resettlement. The argument will proceed in
three parts. First, I will analyze the earliest version of Jewish resettlement in China, which William began exploring in
Penn History Review
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1933. Second, I will show that the Chinese government had
their doubts about Sun co-opting William’s idea in 1939, but
ultimately embraced the Jewish settlement project as a way of
importing the industrial knowledge that they deemed necessary
for building the state.11 Third, I will show that the mentality that
motivated William and Berglas’ dogged pursuit of a Yunnan
settlement was part of a broader shift in the history of Jewish
lish an autonomous entity or state for the Jews in a land that is
not the Land of Israel.”12 From the joint crises of Hitler’s rise
to power and the Japanese invasion of China emerged a brief
synergy between these two disparate intellectual traditions—
Jewish Territorialism and Chinese Nationalist state-building—in
a truly audacious political project.
Part I: Maurice William’s Big Idea
Following the World’s Zionist Conference’s rejection of
the Uganda Scheme in 1903, British author and playwright, Isinstitution: the Jewish Territorial Organization. Like Zionists,
Territorialists believed that in the face of growing anti-Semitism, Jews should establish a permanent settlement outside of
Europe to ensure the long-term security of their people. Unlike Zionists, Territorialists did not believe that this settlement
needed to be in Palestine. But after the initial surge in energy
following the Sixth World Zionist Conference, the Territorialist
movement slowly lost momentum, and by 1925 Zangwill had
disbanded the organization. The rise of Nazi Germany in the
early 1930s and the founding of the Freeland League for Jewish
Territorial Colonization in 1934 brought new life to the movement.13 That same year, Maurice William, a little-known New
Yorker with no ties to institutional Territorialism, conceived
of a plan to apply the Territorialist cause to the unlikeliest of
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places: southwest China.
Maurice William by chance. Though a devoted Marxist in his
early years, William, who made his living as a dentist in Brooklyn, became disillusioned with Communism during the First
World War. The result of his search for a new belief system
was a book, which he published in 1921 with the title, The Social
Interpretation of History: A Refutation of the Marxian Economic
Interpretation of History. Though only a few hundred copies were
printed, by 1924 the book found its way to the southeastern
Chinese port city of Guangzhou and ended up in the hands
of Sun Yat-Sen, founding father of the Chinese republic and
leader of the Chinese Nationalist Party.
When Sun began reading William’s book, he had been
delivering a series of lectures laying out his vision for China’s
“Three Principles of the People,” his articulation of which
“had been communistic in tone.”14 But after a three month
adjournment during which he made William’s book his “constant companion,” Sun had developed a new understanding of
his third principle, (best translated as “People’s Livelihood”).15
According to journalist Katharine Roberts, who published an
article about William in the American Mercury in 1939, “[Sun] explained that he no longer believed in the class struggle but that,
along with Dr. William, he thought better conditions could be
obtained through co-operation of business and labor.”16 From
nese politics, William felt a responsibility to help cultivate the
Republic of China as a liberal democracy.17 Indeed, by the early
1930s, William had come up with a new idea that promised to
reshape China’s development once again.
William’s idea for resettling central European Jewish
refugees in China did not emerge in a vacuum. A network of
Jewish scholars and American Sinologists had close ties to the
Penn History Review
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Chinese Nationalist government long before the outbreak of
the Second World War. Some of these connections, like the one
between Sun and William, occurred by chance. But the presence
of Chinese students at universities like Columbia and Cornell
in the early 20th century also facilitated intellectual exchange.
Celebrated Chinese essayist and May 4th Movement leader Hu
Shih is one notable example. After studying under John Dewey
at Columbia University, Hu adopted Dewey’s pragmatic philosophy and began to apply it to the Chinese context. Hu later
helped organize Dewey’s lecture tour of China from 1919-21,
community of young intellectuals.18
Beginning in 1933, William leveraged his connections
to this network of prominent Jews and intellectuals to seek
advice and support for his resettlement proposal. William wrote
a letter to Albert Einstein on January 30th, 1934, “to send some
in China for German Jews.”19 William’s correspondence with
for the Jewish resettlement project. As William told Einstein in
their initial exchange, The Social Interpretation of History’s legacy in
China would provide Jewish leaders the basis for pursuing such
an ambitious project:
Since a fortunate combination of circumstances made
it possible for me to be of service to the Chinese gov
ernment and the Chinese people and has won me the
good-will of that nation, I should be happy to use this
good-will in the service of our co-religionists of Germany. What practical form this service should take is
the immediate question which I should like to discuss
with you and other Jewish leaders.20
Upon receiving William’s letter, Einstein wrote back declaring
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his enthusiasm for the project. “Your plan,” he wrote, “seems
to me to be very hopeful and rational and its realization must
be pursued energetically.”21
By the time Einstein praised William’s plan, it had
already won the endorsement of several prominent American
intellectuals. “During a visit at the summer home of Judge
Brandeis last September we naturally discussed the plight of
German Jews,” William told Einstein. “He too feels that China
is the one great hope for Hitler’s victims.”22 William had also
consulted with Dewey and his Columbia colleague James T.
Shotwell. “I have gone into this subject in personal interviews
with Professor John Dewey and Professor James T. Shotwell,”
make the most of our opportunities in China.”23 Though Wilown political beliefs, Dewey’s approval must have bolstered his
belief that a plan for Jewish resettlement was achievable.
Einstein never became directly involved in the resettlement project, but his brief correspondence with William in
1934 anticipated many of the ideas that would come to derenowned physicist was quick to point out the cultural resemblance between Jews and the Chinese. To Einstein, cooperation
between the Jewish community and the Chinese was a natural
match given the two groups’ long histories:
The Chinese and Jewish peoples, in spite of any apparent differences in their traditions, have this in common:
both possess a mentality that is the product of cultures
that go back to antiquity. This happy circumstance is a
guarantee of mutual understanding and successful co
operation.24
The idea that Jews and the Chinese were like-minded cultures,
Penn History Review
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temporarily left behind by the sprint to modernization yet still
due for a 20th century rejuvenation, would later become one
Jewish settlement.
Another theme that emerges from Einstein’s letters
to William is the belief that resettling Jews in China would
help the Chinese nation at least as much as it helped the refugees themselves. While ensuring the survival of thousands of
Hitler’s potential victims, William’s resettlement plan could also
provide China with valuable business and industrial expertise,
as Einstein put it in one of his letters to William:
I feel with all my heart that while your efforts will in no
wise impair the invaluable moral and spiritual heritage
of the Chinese people, which has withstood the test
of thousands of years, it will place at the service of
and science.25
Chinese Nationalists advocating for Jewish resettlement echoed
Einstein’s 1934 portrayal of German Jewish refugees in their
dissented from Sun Ke’s promotion of a massive Jewish settlement agreed that China’s government should make use of
paragons of Western expertise and rationality.26
Attached to Einstein’s endorsement of William’s plan
able employment in China, then the plan could not succeed.
William agreed with Einstein that “ascertaining what opportuplan.27 Einstein promised to help attract prominent sponsors
for William’s plan, but only after he was convinced that Ger110
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man Jews traveling to China would not be stripped of their
The fear among Westerners that German Jews would be unable to maintain in China
what they deemed to be an adequate standard of living persisted throughout discussions of Jewish resettlement. For men like
Einstein and William, these concerns were practical rather than
colonialist: ensuring that refugees would have employment opportunities commensurate with their previous careers in central
28

for William’s project.
1930s, however, criticisms from Westerners skeptical of resettlement in China took on a far more racialized tone. At the
China expert Nathaniel Peffer expressed fears that the refugees
would risk stooping to the level of colonized subjects. “China
always has been hopeless as an area for the absorption of large
numbers of Occidentals,” he wrote in an April memorandum
to his Columbia University colleague Joseph P. Chamberlain.
“One does not like to think of the prospect of middle-class
Europeans sinking to the status of coolies and beachcombers,
which is, I myself think, the prospect for three out of every
four Jews who go to China.”29
Einstein’s preoccupation with the quality of German
Jews’ employment opportunities in China in his 1934 letters
to William was indicative of a pre-Holocaust ignorance of the
extermination facing Jews who remained in Europe. Peffer’s
dismissive assessment of Jews’ opportunities in China, on the
continued to hamper efforts to resettle Jews in China. Inher-
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invasion of Poland, no reality facing Jews in Europe could be
worse than the cultural insult of working alongside the “coolies
and beachcombers” of the Orient.30
Unlike Peffer, who focused his analysis on the overcrowded conditions of 1939 Shanghai, William looked at sites
all across China as he began his survey in 1934. “Many of our
survives from their correspondence that year, “insist that the
best results could be expected only if I personally were to go
to China in the interest of our cause.”31 But to invest in such
an expedition, William would need some system of criteria for
assessing potential sites for Jewish settlement. “If I were to go
to China,” he told Einstein, “I would want to do everything
possible to insure the success of our common objective. Since
no one person can hope to think of everything that ought to be
investigated, I shall need the help and advice of our best thinkers.”32
Though Einstein restated his support for William’s
of him giving William the advice he desired. William himself
never ended up making a trip to China, and records of any discussions between William and the Chinese government about
a Jewish settlement plan are nonexistent. Gao has concluded
that Nationalist leaders were likely exposed to William’s Jewish
settlement proposal before 1939 but rejected it out of concern
for their relations with the Nazis, with whom China maintained
diplomatic relations until 1941.33 It was not until Sun got word
of the SMC’s plans to cut off Jewish immigration to Shanghai
in 1939 that he revisited the idea.
Part 2: Sun Ke’s Yunnan Plan
Sun’s original proposal to the National Defense Su-
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a leader preoccupied with enhancing China’s relationship with
destitute people; second, to win the sympathy of the British;
third, to win the sympathy of the U.S.; and fourth, to harness
the talents of Jewish people for the future of China.34
glance, only the second and third reasons seemed to directly
relate to attracting British and American support for the war
against Japan, but there were common threads that underpin
the logic of each of Sun’s four points.
strength lay not in its effectiveness as a project of humanitarian
ence his father’s belief that China should “unite and support
weak nations,” but these idealistic considerations were quickly
subsumed by the more practical arguments that followed.35 It
seems that to the Nationalists, the impact that the plan could
have on the Jewish people was second in importance to the
impact it could have on the view of the British and American
public. “With regard to Britain, the support of the Jewish people would enhance the sympathy of the ordinary British people
toward us,” Sun argued.36 His analysis of the plan’s impact on
America struck similar notes, suggesting that the plan “could
shift the focus of Americans from the Jews toward support
of China.37 In terms of propaganda,” Sun continued, “there
would certainly be much to gain.”38
Far from demonstrating a belief that both China and
Sun’s language revealed a view of humanitarian, political, and
military assistance as a zero-sum game in which Americans’
concern for the plight of European Jews could only take away
from their willingness to help China. Sun’s proposal’s emphasis
on propaganda value can also help to explain why parts of the
Chinese Nationalist government were so quick to embrace such
Penn History Review
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an ambitious project. From Sun’s point of view, the project
would not necessarily need to go into effect for it to serve its
purpose. The plan’s announcement alone could be enough to
rally British and American support for China.
The second common thread in Sun’s logic was the
assessment of the plan. While it is true that many of the most
successful British merchants in the Far East during the nineteenth century, such as the Kadoorie and Sassoon families, were
teers of the West was built more on stereotype than reality:
Furthermore, the British Far Eastern policy actually
hinges on the large merchants and bankers in the Far
East. So the initial obstruction and most recent realization of British economic support <for China> was in
truth manipulated by these large merchants and bank
ers, and since many of these large merchants and bank
the British to have an even more favorable attitude
toward us.39
British economic policy suggests that members of the Chinese
elite, especially the increasingly cosmopolitan and western-educated Nationalists, had internalized the western trope of Jews
40

Jewish stereotypes emerged again in the Chinese foreign
ministry’s analysis of Sun’s proposal. In response to Sun’s claim
that publicizing the settlement plan would have great propaganda value, the foreign ministry wrote:
The enemy and fascist countries are constantly alleging
that we are a communist state, and at this time to take
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giving the enemy a pretext for propaganda. In general,
in fascist theory, communism and the Jews are frequent
ly mentioned in the same breath.41
The Chinese Nationalists themselves clearly did not subscribe
to what historian Paul Hanebrink has called “the myth of
Judeo-Bolshevism,” yet that did not stop fascist governments’
Nationalists’ decision making.42 The Chinese Nationalists’ relationship with these stereotypes also illuminates the paradoxical
nature of anti-Semitic ideology itself: they had to consider Jews’
munist sympathizers. In the Eurocentric world system in which
Sun hoped their Jewish settlement plan would help them play a
part, the Chinese Foreign Ministry did not consider itself to be
in a position to critique the Judeo-Bolshevist ideology. If much
of Europe was sympathetic to the idea of Judeo-Bolshevism,
then the Nationalists felt they must consider its impact in their
propaganda war.
The Nationalists ultimately believed that the status of
the Jews was both an asset and a liability in their efforts to garner war support from Britain and the United States. The Jews’
yet helping Jews could also reinforce Japanese claims about the
Chinese Communists. Gao has argued that the Chinese government’s policy toward Jewish refugees centers around these
wartime considerations.43 But taken as a whole, the text of the
government’s discussions of Sun’s proposed settlement plan
the short term.
Sun’s original proposal found the legislative leader in
two minds about whether the Jewish settlement would be temporary. Sun wrote: “Now, we propose to designate a temporary
Penn History Review
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residence area for Jews in the southwest border region…”44
This language seemed clear enough, yet in his list of reasons for
the plan, Sun elaborated:
With regard to the future building up <of China>, the
many talents. Should we be able to obtain a favorable
impression from them and obtain their support and as
sistance, it would be of an enormous help to us.45
Sun’s argument seemed to reiterate the same themes present
in the sections analyzed above. There was another mention
of gaining “a favorable impression,” and another reference to
46
Yet there were also
conceived of the Jewish peoples’ value not in terms of their
ability to attract sympathy and military support, but in terms of
their ability to contribute directly to “the future building up of
China.”47
ence on British and American foreign policy, but as expertise
that would be necessary for China’s economic development.48
Though much of Sun’s proposal focused on Jewish elites, when
he wrote “the Jewish people” in this passage, he referred not to
the Sassoons or the Kadoories of Shanghai and Hong Kong,
but to the ordinary Jews of central Europe who would populate
the settlement.49
To gain an understanding of the thinking behind Sun’s
words, we need to take note of the government procedures
through which he presented and then disseminated his proposal. As president of the Legislative Yuan, Sun also sat on the
National Defense Supreme Council. It was at a meeting of this
analyses of the deliberations have emphasized the role military
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considerations played in the Nationalists’ support for the proposal without considering the implications of the fact that the
proposal’s original audience was the National Defense Supreme
Council.50
plan to the Defense Council was evidence that he viewed its
military implications as most important, but Sun would have
considered how to frame his presentation of the plan to best
persuade his audience. Sun emphasizes the potential military
impact in his original proposal, but we cannot be sure that this
circumstances in which he presented the plan.
After receiving a copy of the proposal, the Civil AfExecutive Yuan51, ordering them to consider the proposal and
Yuan, then directed the ministries of Internal Affairs, Foreign
Affairs, Military Affairs, Treasury and Transportation, to write
up their opinions of the proposal.52 Unlike Sun, for whom the
Defense Council was originally his primary audience, the various ministries considered the international propaganda value
many, alongside the legality, feasibility, and long-term territoroles. Kong wrote in his summary prefacing the document that
Sun’s plan “would be ill-advised on many accounts.”53 Despite
Sun’s original proposal’s description of the plan as a “temporary” settlement, the various ministries’ concerns about the plan
demonstrate that they understood the proposal as a long-term,
or even permanent, project.54
There was little agreement about where to place the
Jewish refugees: locations close to international borders could
lead to collaboration between the refugees and outsiders, while
a settlement in the far west of the country, a region over which
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China historically had held an inconsistent grasp, brought its
ministries expressed concerns about the effects of a Jewish
settlement on China’s territorial integrity. The Ministry of War
rejected the idea of a permanent settlement altogether. “As for
allowing the stateless Jews to settle,” they wrote, “one ought
not to grant permanent residence or a special area in order to
emphasize territorial sovereignty.”55 Suggestions that the Jewish
should settle next to one of China’s borders, though in line with
ministries’ concerns. “If the area designated for settlement is
adjacent to international borders,” the Finance Ministry wrote,
“we fear that one cannot avoid the emergence of abuses.”56

Kong Xiangxi, circa 1925
While the government’s territorial concerns were
indicative of the mindset of a country under siege from the
agitators also colored their responses to Sun’s proposal.
Kong expressed concerns about the Jews political activities,
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underscoring the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ reference to
Judeo-Bolshevism, mentioned above. “After entering China,”
Kong wrote, “they would not engage in any political activity or
disseminate any ideology . . . if they violate these conditions,
they should be expelled.”57 And though they expressed it with a
distinctly Chinese indirectness, the Ministry of Interior believed
the Jewish refugees could turn out to be spies for a foreign
country. “If a large number of long-term foreigners live on
international routes,” they wrote, “one cannot avoid having our
secrets concerning international and defence matters leaking,
and if by chance we are not completely alert, this could result
in some unfortunate incident.”58 The Foreign Affairs Ministry
echoed these concerns:
Jews have suffered distress and endure hardships, and
are excellent at managing affairs. If the designated area
after they dwell together for some time, if by chance
there develops ethnic self-determination coming to the
point of a demand for autonomy, it will not be easy to
control, and further, if that area is adjacent to the treaty
ports or to international routes, they will easily receive
enticements from outside forces which will not be to our
advantage.59

Foreign Affairs believed that a large group of Jewish refugees
Ministry of Interior agreed, writing: “As for the management of
the said area, its organization ought to be strengthened with the
police organization as its core.”60
The various ministries of the Nationalist government’s
executive branch agreed with Sun’s characterization of the Jews
as a people possessing special characteristics, but they believed
these talents were as much a liability as they were an asset to the
Penn History Review
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interests of the Chinese state. Indeed, the ministries’ concerns
were largely based on their view of the Jewish refugees not as
meek vagabonds, but as administratively skilled and politically
active cosmopolitans.
Both Sun and the executive ministries had territorial
concerns at the top of their minds, but they conceived of
them differently. To Sun, the war with Japan was the central
crisis facing the Nationalist government, and the potential for
assistance from Britain and the United States presented such an
appealing military opportunity that radical measures like a Jewish
settlement had to be considered. To Kong and his colleagues, the
war with Japan was just one issue in a long line of challenges to
Chinese sovereignty which had plagued the country since China’s
defeat in the First Opium War (1839-1842). Their repeated
mention of the dangers of treaty ports and international routes
purchase on Chinese strategic thinking.
as potential communist sympathizers revealed a different
territorial anxiety. Following the split between the Nationalists
and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during the Northern
Expedition in 1927, the Nationalist government had waged an
unsuccessful decade-long campaign to exterminate the CCP.
Though the Japanese invasion forced the two groups to form
a tenuous alliance in 1937, hostilities between the two parties
concerns about communist Jewish refugees were thus not only
Despite the Executive Yuan’s unfavorable review of
Sun’s proposal, they did endorse the idea that Jewish refugees’
technical expertise could help the Nationalists in their statebuilding efforts. In his summary of the ministries’ opinions,
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Kong wrote:
We are in the process of building the nation and we
need many specialists of all sorts, such as scientists,
engineers, doctors, mechanics, and so forth. The
government agencies should survey what they need in
the areas of responsibility, write out a detailed account,
giving clear indication of what personnel they require
and salaries.61
Kong’s suggestion seems reminiscent of Sun’s belief that the
there is a key difference.62
would assess the “specialized abilities” of Jewish refugees
after they had already been settled in the country’s interior.63
For Kong, their expertise was a condition for their admittance
into the country. Sun and Kong’s disagreement on this point
revealed a fundamental difference in how they conceived of
Jewish refugees’ roles in China’s development. Kong advocated
Nationalist government. But Sun’s idea was far more ambitious.
Settle enough Jewish refugees in the sparsely populated areas
of the country’s interior, Sun believed, and they would begin to
organically contribute to China’s larger economic development.
the country’s economy.
The differences between Kong and Sun’s ideas could
have major implications on where the refugees physically ended
up. As government experts, the relatively small number of Jews
that could be admitted under Kong’s plan would most likely
have ended up living in large cities like Chongqing, where the
Nationalist headquarters were housed at the time. By contrast,
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by various departments for construction in our rear areas.”64
These “rear areas” refer to the rural agricultural areas in the
country’s southwest region. In response to Sun’s proposal, the
Ministry of Interior wrote that “the settlement area need only
be in a relatively open place in the southwest, and any will do.”65
While the executive ministries expressed a variety of political
concerns about the location of the settlement, the economic
criterion was simple: any sparsely populated and underdeveloped
Sun and Kong’s openness to using foreign expertise in
the name of modernization was nothing new for the Nationalist
government, which had previously invited League of Nations
experts to consult on the administration and development of
the rural economy in the early 1930s. Margherita Zanasi has
recommendations of League experts.66 Still, Minister of Finance
indicative of the Nationalists’ top-down model of development
in the 1930s. Kong Xiangxi’s conception of how Jewish refugees
could assist the Nationalist government was in line with how
experts from the League had assisted them in the past. Just
as League experts William Kenneth Hunter Campbell, Mario
Dragoni, and Max Brauer had consulted with Nationalists on
the issue of agricultural development starting in 1933, Kong
imagined that German Jewish refugees’ expertise with respect to
for Chinese state building. But nowhere in the written record
of his response to Sun’s proposal did Kong support the idea
of a true Jewish settlement project, through which refugees
would be allowed to integrate into Chinese society, regardless
of their ability to directly assist the government.67 Sun’s proposal
Xiangxi’s preferred method of utilizing foreign expertise. Sun
long term from populating its interior with thousands of formerly
middle-class Jewish refugees, rather than simply choosing a few
122
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experts to work in the Nationalist administration.
Given the unprecedented scale of the Jewish settlement
proposal in a country that had long been wary of foreigners, not
to mention the resemblance between Sun’s 1939 plan and the
plan William discussed with Einstein in 1934, it is hard to imagine
that Sun’s proposal emerged entirely independently of William’s
proposal. In his 1934 letters to Einstein, William mentions
discussing his settlement plan with Alfred Saoke Sze, the current
Chinese ambassador to the United States.68 As Gao outlines in
her article on the Nationalists’ policy toward Jewish refugees, in
1938 Sze’s successor Chenting Thomas Wang proposed that the
Nationalist government assist German Jews, but leaders rejected
the idea out of concern that it would harm China’s relationship
with the Nazi government.69 But just a year later, with the relative
importance of China’s diplomatic relations with Germany quickly
diminishing, Sun Ke fully embraced the idea. It is impossible to
prove whether William’s original efforts to promote the Jewish
settlement plan directly or indirectly inspired Sun’s proposal. But
if Sun did encounter the idea for a Jewish settlement in China
prior to 1939, his positive reception of the proposal could only
have been enhanced by the knowledge that Maurice William,
originator.
The economic transformations set in motion by the
Nationalists’ retreat to west China also played a role in Sun’s
new way of thinking about development. In 1937, as Japan
occupied Nanjing, the southwestern city of Chongqing became
the wartime capital of China. Because China’s economic and
governmental resources had always been concentrated in the
eastern part of the country, the shift in capital brought new life
to the economically backwards southwestern regions of Sichuan,
Yunnan, and Guangxi. George A. Fitch, a Protestant missionary
who recorded his experiences traveling through southwest China
in early 1939, documented the economic impact of China’s mass
western migration:
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The impact of this trained, modern, progressive mass
from the East on the conservative, underdeveloped West
is already startling in its results. More conservative
changes are being made in a year than would perhaps
great migration from the East. Mme. Chiang Kai-Shek
rightly says: “Here our country will make up for more
than it has lost, for we shall build faster and surer open
rejuvenated nation – a new, strong, and robust China.”70
By the time Sun made his proposal in March 1939, the realities
of Japanese invasion were showing Nationalist leaders like
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, the most powerful person in
China, whose wife, Soong May-ling, Fitch quotes in his letter,
that transplanting large numbers of people with industrial
training to sparsely populated rural provinces could have a
China directly inspired Sun to put his proposal in writing. But
Fitch’s account suggests that wartime conditions were making
top leaders like Chiang more open to a development model that
embraced the contributions of all kinds of outsiders, rather than
a narrow group of technical experts.
Part 3: The Berglas and William Yunnan Plans
News of Sun’s proposal quickly spread throughout Europe
and America, in large part due to the Nationalist government’s
promotion of the plan. It was not long before prominent
members of the Jewish community sought to capitalize on the
opportunity. In May 1939, Jacob Berglas submitted a “Plan for
the immigration of Central European Immigrants into China”
to the Chinese League of Nations Union, which then relayed it
to the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Nationalist
Party.71 A successful banker in Berlin whose family had owned
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Germany in 1938 and settled in Shanghai at the invitation of
to the Chinese government.72 While Berglas’ own path to China
that the Nationalists had embraced in the early 1930s, his
settlement proposal called for 100,000 Jewish refugees to form
a permanent settlement in southwest China, an idea which was
more in line with Sun’s new perspective on development.
In June, Berglas held a press conference at the Cathay
Hotel in Shanghai to publicize his settlement plan. An English
language Shanghai newspaper reported that under the plan,
refugees from all over would fully integrate into Chinese society:
The plan, which for the time being is in its infancy, would
call for settling of certain parts of China, particularly
Yunnan province, by emigrants of the whole world,
who, carefully selected as to their abilities and provided
shelter over a period of one year approximately, would
enjoy the same rights of residence and work as the
Chinese, enjoying governmental protection with the
same rights and responsibilities as Chinese citizens.73
The newspaper report of his press conference suggests that in
promoting the plan, Berglas framed the settlement in universalist
however, from his correspondence with Bernard Kahn, who was
European director of the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee
at the time, that Berglas conceived of the plan as a Jewish
settlement. In a memorandum on his conversations with Berglas
in November 1939, Kahn reported: “I had several conversations
with Mr. Berglas concerning his plan to bring 100,000 Jews to
China.”74 The settlement which Berglas envisioned contained
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The fact that Berglas declared that his settlement would
be populated “by emigrants of the whole word, irrespective
the Chinese press but then framed it as a Jewish settlement in
conversations with Jewish relief organizations might seem
a shrewd bit of salesmanship. As discussed in my analysis of
the Nationalists’ internal discussion of Sun’s Yunnan Plan,
the Chinese government sought to emphasize the proposal’s
humanitarian aspects when publicizing it, even when military and
place. Berglas, no doubt having read reports of Sun’s plan that
were born out of this propaganda strategy, focused on universal,
humanitarian concerns when promoting his own plan in China.
In reality, selling the Yunnan Plans as a settlement designed for
Jewish refugees in particular was crucial to the Nationalists’ goal
of attracting military support from American and British leaders,
came to East Asia policy.
In his June press conference, Berglas also sought to
portray his settlement as egalitarian. The Jewish refugees, once
settled, would not be considered a class above local Chinese
people, but “would enjoy the same rights of residence and work
as the Chinese, enjoying governmental protection with the same
rights and responsibilities as Chinese citizens.”75 Once again,
Kahn’s record of his discussions with Berglas contradicted this
framing. “His plan is that 100,000 people should be brought
to China,” Kahn wrote, “to be established there in hundreds
of industries of all kinds and in commercial enterprises. They
should be the entrepreneurs and technical experts, the workers
to be Chinese.”76
Though Berglas’ promotion of an egalitarian settlement
based on the principle of universal equality might appeal to 21st
century sensibilities, neither Chinese Nationalist leaders nor
prominent Jewish philanthropists had completely moved beyond
a colonialist world view. To men like Bernard Kahn and Albert
Einstein, it was clear that middle-class Jews from Europe should
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not have to stoop to the level of rural peasants as they populated
western China.
Nationalist leaders, many of them Western-educated,
would not have openly advocated a policy of elevating foreigners
over Chinese citizens, but they too clung to a colonialist
outlook with respect to different regions within their own
country. Chiang Kai-Shek’s wife observed the rapid economic
development of western provinces like Guizhou and Sichuan
with great enthusiasm. But it was only through the migration
“of this trained, modern, progressive mass from the East” to
the undeveloped hinterlands that such progress was possible.77
The same mindset that allowed her to celebrate the migration of
China’s Westernized coastal elite allowed Sun and others to fully
embrace the importation of a similar class of Jews from central
Europe.
Berglas’ framing and promotion of his settlement
plan were indicative of a less-than-intimate knowledge of
Nationalist party politics. Berglas had no dealings with the
Chinese government prior to 1938, and without knowing any
better, seemed to have taken the Nationalists’ emphasis on
humanitarian concerns in their promotion of Sun’s plan at face
value. Though Berglas won verbal agreement from Yunnan’s
at the top levels of the Nationalist government.78
Later that month, Maurice William got word of Sun’s
proposal and proposed his own settlement plan, appealing
Kong Xiangxi, and Sun Ke himself. William sought to explicitly
distinguish his proposal from Berglas’ plan by emphasizing
the assistance that Jewish refugees could offer China. “Instead
of asking China for help,” William wrote, “I propose that we
concentrate on China’s problem and use the help of German
Jews to solve those problems. A home and employment in China
awaits [sic] German Jews only as a by-product of their services
in promoting China’s welfare.”79
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in China back in 1933, William had believed that the business
China’s economic development.
The 1939 iteration of William’s plan also made explicit
reference to Nationalist war aims. According to William, China
was “locked in a life and death struggle . . . and should not be
expected to assume additional burdens.”80 As Gao has shown in
her analysis of correspondence between William and Nationalist
leaders in 1939, William sought to reassure Chinese leaders
that Jewish refugees would “carry with them the good-will of
the Jews of every nation.”81 His language seemed like a clear
reference to Sun’s argument that a Jewish settlement could help
China attract Western support for its war with Japan. Former
Chinese ambassador to the United States Wang Zhenting was
immediately convinced, telling a colleague that adopting the plan
would help China “win support from the Jews all over the world,
particularly from those in America and England where the Jews
82

By foregrounding the technical expertise middleclass German Jews could bring to the Chinese economy while
William’s framing of his Jewish settlement plan appealed to the
existing Chinese Nationalist outlook with uncanny precision. In
fact, William’s correct reading of Nationalist leaders’ mindsets
was no coincidence. William had been in contact with Wang
Zhengting’s successor, Hu Shih, who kept him abreast of the
Chinese government’s internal discussions.83 That William’s plan
received greater support from the Chinese government than
Berglas’ therefore had more to do with William’s connections
within the Chinese government than it did with any substantive
difference between the two plans.
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Conclusion: The Territorialist Dream
Despite the Nationalist government’s enthusiastic
acceptance of the Yunnan Plans, both William and Berglas found
Berglas was turned down by Jewish philanthropists in Europe,
who felt that his plan was far-fetched. Bernard Kahn “told
him that the settlement of 100,000 persons within one year, as
he proposes, would seem a technical impossibility quite apart
84
Kahn and his colleagues at the Joint
Distribution Committee had been exploring options for a Jewish
settlement in China, but on a much smaller scale. “We were of the
possibilities for such settlements existed for groups of not more
than 1000 or 2000 people and this included workingmen which are
excluded in the Berglas plan.”85 William had also failed to attract
American sponsors for his Yunnan Plan, as a preoccupation
with the war in Europe and growing anti-immigrant sentiment
at home discouraged the Roosevelt Administration from getting
involved in international settlement schemes.86
Despite the Yunnan Plans’ failures, it is still worth
considering why William and Berglas remained so consumed
by the dream of a Jewish settlement in China. With William’s
1938, both men felt a personal connection to the country. Both
men also felt sincere concern for the fate of their co-religionists
in Germany, but these emotional considerations alone cannot
fully explain William and Berglas’ devotion to their Yunnan
Plans.
According to historian Laura Almagor, the Jewish
Territorialism underwent a transformation during World War II:
In this new world order the Freelanders continued to
value to the betterment of humankind, could only be
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truly rebuilt outside Europe, where antisemitism had
not yet polluted the general public opinion. This new life
would work in a relatively unpopulated area, through
concentrated colonization with cooperative methods,
but without achieving statehood.87
Both William and Berglas found such a place in
Yunnan province. After traveling to Yunnan’s provincial capital,
Kunming, in the summer of 1939, Berglas recalled that “the
city of Kunming has nearly 300,000 inhabitants, eternal spring,
beautiful landscape, [and] rich mineral resources.”88 Here was a
place where anti-Semitism did not run rampant, which remained
sparsely peopled despite the immense Chinese population, and
where Jewish life could be truly rebuilt through concentrated
colonization.
In her study of the relationship between Jewish
Territorialism and mid-20th century geopolitics, Almagor argues
that Territorialists “relied on accepted notions and practices such
as colonialism and colonization, ‘whiteness’, race, biopolitics
and agro-industrial science, as well as (empty) spaces and
un(der)developed territories.”89 William and Berglas built their
settlement plans around these same notions, with a particular
focus on the contrast between the expertise of the Jewish race
and underdeveloped territories of west China. By the late 1930s,
the Nationalist government began to accept these Western
notions of development, not as an imposition, but a means of
building the state and asserting themselves internationally. Their
embrace of the Yunnan Plans is perhaps the best evidence of
this strategy. But the story of the Yunnan Plans also shows that
in their efforts to build a new Chinese state, Nationalist leaders
were no more immune than the Jewish Territorialists from the
intellectual legacies of the Old World.
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